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IN RE PARKER: THE TENTH CIRCUIT CHOOSES Two PATHS
OF ANALYSIS FOR THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
INTRODUCTION
On December 23, 2002, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in In re
Parker II,l resolved the ambiguity of two important bankruptcy issues.2
First, the Tenth Circuit adopted a mechanical analysis for determining
whether to reopen a no asset, no bar date case, for use in deciding
whether the claim is discharged according to section 523(a)(3)(A) 3 of the
Bankruptcy Code.4 The mechanical approach does not allow equitable
considerations to intrude into a court's decision of whether to reopen a
no asset case with no bar date.5 Second, the Tenth Circuit adopted the
conduct approach to determine the date a claim arises for purposes of the
Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provision.6 Under the conduct ap-
proach, a claim arises on the date when the conduct causing the claim
actually occurs, as opposed to when state law allows a claim to be com-
menced in court.' The Tenth Circuit's holdings regarding both the me-
chanical approach and conduct approach show the court's desire to pro-
tect the debtor and preserve the "fresh start" philosophy of the Bank-
ruptcy Code.8
A no asset, no bar date case is a case in which it appears from the
bankruptcy schedules that the debtor has no unencumbered assets that
could result in a distribution to creditors through liquidation.9 If a debtor
has no assets to liquidate, the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure likely will
1. Watson v. Parker (In re Parker I) 313 F.3d 1267 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct.
429 (2003).
2. See In re Parker H, 313 F.3d at 1268.
3. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3)(A) (2000). This survey deals exclusively with Bankruptcy issues
under the Bankruptcy Code. Whenever a code section is referenced in the main text, that code sec-
tion will fall within II U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (2000).
4. See In re Parker 11, 313 F.3d at 1268-69.
5. Id. at 1269 (quoting Watson v. Parker (In re Parker 1), 264 B.R. 685, 695 (B.A.P. 10th
Cir. 2001), aff'd, 313 F.3d 1267 (10th Cir. 2002)).
6. Id. at 1269-70. The automatic stay provision is located in section 362(a)(1) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2000). The statute identifies those situations in which a stay of judi-
cial action against a debtor is imposed. See id.
7. In re Parker II, 313 F.3d at 1269. But see Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M.
Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332, 337 (3d Cir. 1984) ("[W]hile federal law controls which claims are
cognizable under the Code, the threshold question of when a right to payment arises, absent overrid-
ing federal law, 'is to be determined by reference to state law."' (quoting Vanston Bondholders
Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 161 (1946))).
8. The "fresh start" philosophy of the Bankruptcy Code is the philosophy that "all legal
obligations of the debtor, no matter how remote or contingent, will be able to be dealt with in bank-
ruptcy." Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 198, 202 (4th Cir. 1988). Further, the automatic stay
provision provides "a breathing spell to the debtor to restructure his affairs .... " Grady, 839 F.2d at
202.
9. See Dawson v. Unruh (In re Dawson), 209 B.R. 246, 248 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1997); see
also FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(e) (Notice of No Dividend).
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not impose a bar date because, with no assets to distribute, it is irrelevant
whether creditors file a claim.' When the debtor files for bankruptcy, in
the spirit of the Bankruptcy Code's fresh start philosophy, the debtor is
seeking the discharge of all her outstanding debts." In the debtor's peti-
tion for bankruptcy, she is required to name all of her outstanding debts
as well as the creditors to whom those debts are owed.
12
The mechanical approach applies in situations where, after the
debtor has received her discharge from the bankruptcy court, she re-
members that she omitted a creditor from her schedule of creditors.' 3 The
debtor wonders whether she must petition to reopen her Chapter 7 no
asset, no bar date case to receive a discharge from the omitted debt.'
4
Additionally, the debtor worries whether section 523(a)(3)(A), which
excepts a claim from discharge "if it was neither listed nor scheduled and
the creditor did not have notice or actual knowledge of the case so that
the creditor could timely file a claim," will apply to the omitted debt.
1 5
The debtor also worries whether the court will inquire into her intent
behind the omission of the creditor. 6 Under the mechanical approach
that the Tenth Circuit adopted in In re Parker II, the debtor will be able
to remedy her forgetfulness and receive a discharge without reopening
her bankruptcy case. 7 Consequently, the debtor will no longer need to
worry about the court inquiring into the circumstances around her forget-
fulness, nor need she worry about whether section 523(a)(3)(A) will bar
the dischargeability of her debt. 18 This result, however, would be differ-
ent if the debtor's court was on the other side of the circuit split which
adopts the equitable approach.' 9
The Federal circuits are split regarding whether a debtor must re-
open a bankruptcy case to receive a discharge from an omitted claim, and
whether the bankruptcy court should look into the debtor's intent behind
failing to originally file the claim before allowing it to be reopened.20
Section 350(b) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a bankruptcy case to be
10. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3002(a). A bar date pursuant to Rule 3002(c) of the Federal Rules
of Bankruptcy Procedure is a date that serves as a deadline for creditors to file a proof of claim in
which to receive a dividend or participate in the debtor's bankruptcy proceedings. See FED. R.
BANKR. P. 3002(c); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(e). Rules 3002(a) and 2002(e) are used in the
context of this Survey to illuminate the effect of a debtor's absolute lack of assets on the procedures
of a bankruptcy case.
11. See In re Parker1, 264 B.R. at 694.
12. 11 U.S.C. § 521(1) (2000).
13. See Alexander L. Edgar, The Law of Reopening - Revisited, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb.
2001, at 8, 8.
14. See In re Parker 1, 264 B.R. at 693.
15. Id. at 695.
16. See id. at 693-94. Courts that apply the equitable, rather than conduct, approach reason
that "the intent of the Debtor at the time of the omission is relevant to the inquiry." Id. at 694 (dis-
cussing e.g., Stark v. St. Mary's Hosp. (In re Stark), 717 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1983)).
17. In re Parker I, 313 F.3d at 1269 (quoting In re Parker , 264 B.R. at 695).
18. See id.
19. E.g., In re M. Frenville Co., 744 F.3d 332.
20. In re Parker , 264 B.R. at 693.
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reopened in the same court in which it was closed.2' The federal courts
that adopt the equitable approach hold that the debtor's intent behind
failing to list the omitted claim is relevant when deciding whether to re-
open a bankruptcy case. 22 These courts view the reopening of the bank-
ruptcy case as a necessary step before discharging an omitted debt under
section 523(a)(3)(A).23 The circuits that use the mechanical approach
hold that the reopening of a bankruptcy case has no effect on the dis-
chargeability of a debt.24 The mechanical approach is based on the notion
that the discharge of a debt is done by operation of law under section 727
of the Code, and that section 523(a)(3)(A) does not apply to a no asset,
no bar date case. 25 The debtor's intent behind not filing the claim origi-
nally is irrelevant under the mechanical approach.26 In In re Parker H,
the Tenth Circuit adopted the mechanical approach.27
In re Parker H also decided another important bankruptcy issue re-
garding the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provision.
28 Section
362(a)(1) sets forth "an automatic stay of, among other things, judicial
action against the debtor 'to recover a claim against the debtor that arose
before the commencement of the case under this title."' 29 For purposes of
the automatic stay provision, federal courts have taken two approaches to
the method of determining whether a claim arose before or after the
bankruptcy proceedings were filed.30 The first approach used by the
courts is the conduct theory, in which the date the claim arises is deter-
mined by the date in which the conduct "giving rise to the claim" oc-
curs.31 The second approach, the accrual theory, "determines the date of
a claim pursuant to the state law under which liability for the claim
arose. '32 In In re Parker II, the Tenth Circuit adopted the conduct the-
ory.
33
21. 11 U.S.C. § 350(b) (2000).
22. See In re Parker 1, 264 B.R. at 693-94.
23. Id.; see also In re Stark, 717 F.2d at 324.
24. In re Parker 1, 264 B.R. at 694.
25. See id.; see also Zimhelt v. Madaj (In re Madaj), 149 F.3d 467, 472 (6th Cir. 1998).
26. In re Parker 1, 264 B.R. at 694.
27. In re Parker 11, 313 F.3d at 1268.
28. See id. at 1269 ("The second issue concerns determination of the date on which a claim
arose for purposes of classifying it as a pre-or post-petition claim.").
29. In re Parker 11, 313 F.3d at 1270 (citing Grady, 839 F.2d at 202 (quoting 11 U.S.C. §
362(a)(1) (2000)) (emphasis added). Claims arising pre-petition are claims made by creditors,
against the debtor, before the debtor files for bankruptcy. See generally Robert J. Scott, When a
Claim Arises Under the Bankruptcy Code, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 253 (1995). Claims that arise post-
petition are those where the creditor seeks collection of a debt owed after the debtor has filed for
bankruptcy. See generally id.
30. See In re Parker H, 313 F.3d at 1269.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. ("We now adopt the conduct theory as the one more in tune with the plain language
and the policy underlying the Bankruptcy Code.").
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I. BACKGROUND OF CIRCUIT SPLITS
In 1904, the Supreme Court decided Birkett v. Columbia Bank.34 In
Birkett, the Supreme Court strictly interpreted bankruptcy law to protect
the creditor from the debtor "experimenting" with the law and to allow
the creditor the "natural" rights of the law.35 Interpreting the bankruptcy
law at the time, the Supreme Court discussed the importance of a debtor
scheduling a debt and listing creditors in a bankruptcy proceeding. 36 Re-
ferring to Section 17 of the Bankrupt Law of 1898, a predecessor to sec-
tion 523(a)(3)(A) of the current code, the Supreme Court held that actual
knowledge of a bankruptcy proceeding was knowledge that allowed the
creditor to timely avail himself of the benefits of law.37 The Court re-
jected the notion that actual knowledge included any knowledge of the
bankruptcy proceedings regardless of the timing.38 The Court held that
bankruptcy law would be defective if it did not allow the creditor reme-
dies against the debtor.39 Thus, the Court in Birkett held that debts
scheduled after the original petition, "omitted debts," would not be dis-
charged in bankruptcy because of the prejudice against the creditor.4°
In 1978, Congress adopted the Bankruptcy Reform Act.4' The
Bankruptcy Reform Act created the present Bankruptcy Code.42 Con-
gress's enactment of the Code was intended to overrule Birkett.43 The
Code was enacted as "a significant departure from present law.... [T]he
bill contemplates that all legal obligations of the debtor, no matter how
remote or contingent, will be able to be dealt with in the bankruptcy
34. 195 U.S. 345 (1904).
35. Birkett, 195 U.S. at 350-51; see also Bruce White & Maria H. Belfield, Is the Debtor's
Failure to List Claims Fatal?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., May 1998, at 40, 40. Birkett was interpreting
the Bankrupt Law of 1898, the existing bankruptcy law at the time. See Birkett, 195 U.S. at 349.
36. Birket, 195 U.S. at 349.
37. Id. at 350 (discussing § 17 of the Bankrupt Law of 1898, repealed by the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-958, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330)). Sec-
tion 17 of the Bankrupt Law of 1898 provided:
A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt of all of his provable debts, except
such as... have not been duly scheduled in time for proof and allowance, with the name
of the creditor if known to the bankrupt, unless such creditor had notice or actual knowl-
edge of the proceedings in bankruptcy ....
Id. at 349 (quoting § 17 of the Bankrupt Law of 1898).
38. See id. at 350.
39. Id.
40. See id. at 350-5 1; see also White & Belfield, supra note 35, at 40 (citing Birkett, 195 U.S.
at 350).
41. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-958, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C.
§§ 101-1330).
42. See White & Belfield, supra note 35, at 40-41.
43. Beezley v. Cal. Land Title Co. (In re Beezley), 994 F.2d 1433, 1439 (9th Cir. 1993)
(O'Scannlain, J., concurring) ("The legislative history of section 523(a)(3) declares unambiguously
that Birkett was intended to be overruled.").
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case." 44 Congress's 1978 enactment of the Bankruptcy Code was in-
tended to allow the debtor a fresh start.45
Two parts of the 1978 Code are relevant to In re Parker II: section
523 and section 362.46 Section 523 states, in pertinent part:
(a) A discharge under section 727 . . . of this title does not dis-
charge an individual debtor from any debt--
(3) neither listed nor scheduled ... in time to permit--
(A) if such debt is not of a kind specified in paragraph (2),
(4), or (6) of this subsection, timely filing of a proof of
claim, unless such creditor had notice or actual knowledge
47of the case in time for such timely filing; ....
In re Parker H also addresses section 362 of the Code, known as the
automatic stay provision.48 The automatic stay provision provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition
filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title ... operates as a stay,
applicable to all entities, of--
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issu-
ance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative,
or other action or proceeding against the debtor that was or
could have been commenced before the commencement of
the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case un-
49der this title; ....
A. The History of Circuit Splits Regarding Section 523
The circuit courts are split regarding how section 523 of the Code
affects the dischargeability of an omitted claim in a no asset, no bar date
bankruptcy, and the analysis the court should use in determining whether
to reopen a case. 50 The Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have held that a
debtor's intent "is irrelevant to the bankruptcy court's decision to re-
open" a case.51 Since a debtor is required to list all creditors and debts
44. Watson v. Parker (In re Parker 1), 264 B.R. 685, 697 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2001), affd, Wat-
son v. Parker (In re Parker 1), 313 F.3d 1267 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting S. REP. No. 95-989, at 21-22
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787).
45. In re Parker 1, 264 B.R. at 697-98.
46. See In re Parker 1I, 313 F.3d 1267, 1269-70 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a)(1), 523(a)(3)(A)
(2000)).
47. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3)(A).
48. In re Parker 11, 313 F.3d at 1270.
49. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1).
50. See In re Parker 11, 313 F.3d at 1268.
51. Id. at 1268-69 (citing Zimhelt v. Madaj (In re Madaj), 149 F.3d 467, 471 (6th Cir. 1998);
Judd v. Wolfe (In re Judd), 78 F.3d 110, 115-16 (3d Cir. 1996); In re Beezley, 994 F.2d at 1439).
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owed to each creditor upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition,52 these
courts do not look to the debtor's intent behind omitting a creditor or
debt from the original bankruptcy petition.53 This approach is known as
the mechanical approach.54 The Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits
have held that a court must look to the debtor's intent for omitting the
claim to determine whether or not to reopen a bankruptcy case. These
circuits adopt the equitable approach.56
The Third Circuit adopted the mechanical approach in In re Judd.
57
There, the Third Circuit held that the scheduling of a debt, or lack of
scheduling, does not affect the debt's dischargeability.5s The Third Cir-
cuit holds that it is therefore unnecessary to reopen a bankruptcy claim to
receive a discharge. 59 The Sixth Circuit in In re Mada] adopted the me-
chanical approach, calling the reopening of a no asset bankruptcy case to
schedule an omitted debt a "useless gesture." 6° Finally, the Ninth Circuit
also adopted the mechanical analysis in In re Beezley.6'
The Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have held that the
debtor's intent is relevant when deciding whether or not to reopen a
bankruptcy case.62 The Seventh Circuit was the first to adopt this ap-
proach in In re Stark. There, the Seventh Circuit held that "a debtor may
reopen the estate to add an omitted creditor where there is no evidence of
,,63fraud or intentional design. With this holding, the Seventh Circuit
opened the door to the inference that the reopening of a debtor's chapter
7 no asset case is relevant to the dischargeability of a claim.
64
In In re Faden, the Fifth Circuit held that the debtor's intent for fail-
ing to schedule a creditor is relevant to the dischargeability of a debt
under section 523(a)(3)(A).65 The Fifth Circuit went beyond In re Stark's
analysis and adopted three factors relevant to evaluate
52. 11 U.S.C. § 521(1).
53. In re Parker 1, 264 BR. at 694; see also infra notes 132-62 and accompanying text.
54. See In re Parker 1, 264 B.R. at 694.
55. Id. at 693-94 (citing Faden v. Ins. Co. of N. Am. (In re Faden), 96 F.3d 792, 797 (5th Cir.
1996); Stark v. St. Mary's Hosp. (In re Stark), 717 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1983); Samuel v. Baitcher (In
re Baitcher), 781 F.2d 1529, 1534 (11 th Cir. 1986)).
56. See id. at 693 (citing In re Faden, 96 F.3d at 797. In re Stark, 717 F.2d 322: In re
Baitcher, 781 F.2d at 1534).
57. See In re Judd, 78 F.3d at 115.
58. Id. at Ill.
59. Id.
60. In re Madaj, 149 F.3d at 468.
61. In re Beezley, 994 F.2d at 1434.
62. See In re Parker 1, 264 B.R. at 693-94 (citing In re Faden, 96 F.3d at 797; In re Stark, 717
F.2d 322; In re Baitcher, 781 F.2d at 1534).
63. In re Stark, 717 F.2d at 324.
64. See Edgar, supra note 13, at 8.
65. See In re Faden, 96 F.3d at 796 (citing Robinson v. Mann, 339 F.2d 547, 550 (5th Cir.
1964) (reasoning that a court should not discharge a debt under section 523(a) if the debtor's failure
was due to intentional design, fraud, or improper motive)).
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whether a debtor's failure to list a creditor properly will prevent dis-
charge of the unscheduled debt: (1) the reasons the debtor failed to
list the creditor; (2) the amount of disruption that would likely occur;
and (3) the prejudice suffered by the listed creditors and the unlisted
creditor in question.
66
The Fifth Circuit also places the burden on the debtor to show that the
failure to schedule the creditor was not motivated by fraud or intentional
design. 67 Thus, the Fifth Circuit adopted an equitable approach to deter-
mining whether or not an omitted debt should be discharged pursuant to
section 523(a)(3)(A).6s
The Eleventh Circuit held the debtor's intent to be relevant for pur-
poses of discharge under section 523(a)(3)(A) of the Code in In re
Baitcher.69 Following the Seventh Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit held that
fraud or intentional design must be absent for a debtor to receive a dis-
charge for an unscheduled debt under section 523(a)(3)(A) of the Code.7 °
The Tenth Circuit was undecided on the proper approach to reopen-
ing a no asset, no bar date case until In re Parker 11.71 Prior to In re
Parker II, the Tenth Circuit, in In re Dawson,72 held that equitable con-
siderations could not override section 523(a)(3)(A) in a no asset case, but
did not address whether equitable considerations would apply in a no
asset case with no set bar date.73 Additionally, the Tenth Circuit did not
address whether the court should consider the debtor's intent for failing
to schedule a claim when determining whether to reopen a no asset, no
bar date case. 74 In In re Dawson, the Tenth Circuit referred to its adher-
ence to a "stricter construction" of the Code and desire to follow the
"clear language of the statute. 75 The Tenth Circuit, however, remained
undecided on both of these issues regarding a no asset, no bar date case
until In re Parker 11.76
66. Id. The Fifth Circuit finds the three relevant factors from an earlier case, Robinson. Id.
(citing Robinson, 339 F.2d at 550). Robinson was decided prior to the enactment of the modern
Bankruptcy Code in 1978. See id. Thus, in In re Faden, the Fifth Circuit is adopting the Robinson
principles for analysis under the new Code. See id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 797 ("Thus, even absent prejudice, equitable action should not be taken in cases
where the debtor's failure to properly schedule a creditor is a result of more than 'mere negligence or
inadvertence."').
69. See In re Baitcher, 781 F.2d at 1534.
70. See id.
71. See In re Parker H, 313 F.3d at 1268.
72. Dawson v. Unruh (In re Dawson), 209 B.R. 246 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1997).
73. In re Dawson, 209 B.R. at 250.
74. In re Parker , 264 B.R. at 694 n.8 (discussing In re Dawson decision).
75. In re Dawson, 209 B.R. at 250. The Tenth Circuit refers to two lines of reasoning, the
liberal approach and the stricter approach, which emerged from the predecessor of section 523(a)(3)
under the repealed Bankruptcy Act. Id.
76. See In re Parker HI, 313 F.3d at 1269.
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B. The History of Circuit Splits Regarding Section 362(a)(1)
The circuit courts are split regarding whether to use the conduct ap-
proach or accrual approach for determining the date a claim arises for
purposes of the Code's automatic stay provision.77 The date a claim
arises serves to classify a claim as pre-petition or post-petition with re-
gard to the automatic stay provision under section 362(a)(1). 78 A claim is
a right to payment, made by a creditor, that the debtor desires to be dis-
charged by filing for bankruptcy. 79 If a claim is classified as a post-
petition claim, the debtor will not receive protection under the bank-
ruptcy laws and the claim will not be discharged.80 Thus, a debtor can
only receive relief from the bankruptcy proceedings, the discharge of a
claim against him, if the claim is classified as pre-petition. 81 A creditor
may want a claim to be classified as pre-petition or post-petition depend-
ing on the type of bankruptcy proceeding.82 Most likely, however, a
creditor would prefer a claim to be classified as post-petition, because the
claim will not be discharged in bankruptcy and will be a remaining obli-
gation when the bankruptcy is complete.83
The conduct approach to determining when a claim arose for pur-
poses of classifying it as a pre-petition or post-petition claim is the pre-
dominate approach among the circuit courts.84 The conduct approach
classifies a claim as a pre-petition one if "the acts giving rise to the al-
leged liability were performed" prior to the commencement of bank-
85ruptcy proceedings. The Fourth Circuit adopted the conduct approach
in Grady v. A.H. Robbins Co.86 The Fourth Circuit approach is an exam-
ple of the basic conduct approach, which does not refer to state law to
determine when a claim arises.8 7 Grady held that a claim is classified as
pre-petition if the conduct causing the claim occurs prior to the bank-
ruptcy petition.88 Section V, Part A of this paper, infra, will discuss
Grady's holdings in detail.
Only the Third Circuit adopts the accrual approach. 89 The accrual
approach looks at the law of the state in which the claim arose to deter-
77. Id.
78. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1).
79. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 240-41 (7th ed. 1999) ("A right to payment or to an
equitable remedy for breach of performance if the breach gives rise to a right to payment.").
80. See Grady, 839 F.2d at 200-01.
81. Dale Ellen Azaria, When Is a Claim a Claim? A Bankruptcy Code Riddle, 62 TENN. L.
REV. 205, 207-08 (1995).
82. See id. at 208-09 (explaining that a putative creditor may want to participate depending on
the likelihood they will prevail in other forums besides the bankruptcy arena).
83. See id.
84. See In re Parker I, 313 F.3d at 1269.
85. Scott, supra note 29, at 263 (quoting In re Johns-Manville Corp., 57 BR. 680, 690
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986)).
86. Grady, 839 F.2d at 201.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 203.
89. In re Parker 11, 313 F.3d at 1269 (quoting Grady, 839 F.2d at 201).
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mine the date of the claim.90 The Third Circuit adopted this approach in
In re M. Frenville Co.91 There, the Third Circuit held that the automatic
stay provision is "not all encompassing" and requires a claim, in order to
receive the protection from automatic stay, to have commenced or have
92been able to commence. In determining whether a claim could have
been commenced before the filing of bankruptcy, the Third Circuit fo-
cuses on when a claim's right to payment arose, and inquiry which turns
on state law.93
While the majority of the circuits have adopted the conduct ap-
proach, there is a split between two versions of the conduct approach.94
Courts are split between adopting the basic conduct approach, illustrated
in Grady, or a more narrow conduct theory.95 In re Piper Aircraft Corp.9 6
articulates the narrow conduct approach. This approach, in essence, nar-
rows the definition of a prepetition claim under the conduct theory.97
Under the narrow conduct approach, "a claim arises at the time of the
conduct upon which the debtor's liability is based only if the claimant
had a specific relationship with the debtor at the time the conduct oc-
curred., 98 The Tenth Circuit has not decided whether to adopt the nar-
row version of the conduct approach or to continue with the basic the-
ory.99 Thus, for purposes of this paper, the conduct approach referred to
herein will be the basic conduct approach as articulated by Grady.
Prior to In re Parker II, the Tenth Circuit was undecided as to
which theory to adopt in determining whether to classify a particular
claim as pre-petition or post-petition for the purposes of the automatic
stay provision. °° In In re Grynberg,1°1 the Tenth Circuit avoided taking
sides on the circuit split.10 2 The court stated that "[wihile it is superfi-
cially tempting to analyze this case based on whether the claim can be
categorized as prepetition ... our evaluation persuades us that a different
analysis is required."' 1 3 Similarly, in In re Franklin Savings Ass'n,1°4 the
Tenth Circuit again avoided a definitive decision on which standard to
90. Id.
91. Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332, 334-35 (3d
Cir. 1984).
92. In re M. Frenville Co., 744 F.2d at 334-35.
93. Id. at 337.
94. In re Parker 11, 313 F.3d at 1270 n..
95. In re Parker 1, 264 B.R. at 697-98.
96. 162 B.R. 619 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994), afTd, 168 B.R. 434 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
97. In re Parker 1, 264 B.R. at 697 n.12.
98. Id. at 697.
99. In re Parker II, 313 F.3d at 1270 n.I.
100. Id. at 1268-69.
101. Grynberg v. Danzig Claimants (In re Grynberg), 966 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1992).
102. See In re Grynberg, 966 F.2d at 572.
103. Id.
104. Franklin Savs. Ass'n v. Office of Thrift Supervision (In re Franklin Savs. Ass'n), 31 F.3d
1020 (10th Cir. 1994).
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adopt. 10 5 The In re Franklin Savings Ass'n court held that it was able to
classify the Director's costs as a pre-petition claim under both the accrual
and conduct theories.' 06 Thus, the court decided it would be superfluous
to make the decision of which theory to adopt at that time.' °7 In In reParker II, the Tenth Circuit finally adopted the conduct approach.'0 8
II. TENTH CIRCUIT: DECIDING ON TWO PATHS OF ANALYSIS FOR THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE
A. In re Parker 1019
1. Facts
In re Parker 1I is an appeal from the United States bankruptcy ap-
pellate panel." 0 Parker, the debtor, was at one time the attorney for Wat-
son, the creditor."' In December of 1995, Parker filed a complaint for
Watson in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas
against Watson's former employer. 12 The District Court ordered Parker
to file a motion by May 24, 1996, stating why the case should not be
dismissed for failure to serve the defendant within the required 120
days." 3 Parker neglected to file a timely response and the case was dis-
missed."14 On November 26, 1996, Parker filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy
and failed to list Watson as a creditor." 5 During the pendency of his
bankruptcy, Parker admitted to committing malpractice in Watson's case
and filed a motion on January 23, 1997, to reinstate her case. 116 Subse-
quently, Watson terminated Parker's employment as her attorney."
7
Parker received a discharge from bankruptcy on May 14, 1998.18 Wat-
son filed a malpractice case against Parker in July 1998.119 Parker as-
serted the affirmative defense that Watson's claim had been discharged
by his bankruptcy. 120 On May 6, 2000, Parker filed a motion to reopen
his Chapter 7 case in order to include Watson's claim, and additionally to
receive a discharge from the debt.' 2' Watson opposed the reopening of
105. In re Franklin Says. Ass'n, 31 F.3d at 1022.
106. Id.
107. See id.
108. In re Parker II, 313 F.3d at 1269.
109. Watson v. Parker (In re Parker II), 313 F.3d 1267 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 124 U.S.
429 (2003).
110. In re Parker I, 313 F.3d at 1268.
111. Watson v. Parker (In re Parker I), 264 B.R. 685, 689-90 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2001), af'd,
313 F.3d 1267 (10th Cir. 2002).












Parker's Chapter 7 case because she believed the reopening would affect
the dischargeability of her claim and equitable principals precluded the
court from reopening the bankruptcy.122 Watson believed that the re-
opening of Parker's bankruptcy should be prevented by the court because
of laches, equitable estoppel, or because she would suffer unfair preju-
dice from the possible reopening.
23
On October 5, 2000, the bankruptcy court permitted Parker's case to
be reopened and Watson's debt discharged.1 24 First, the bankruptcy court
found the reopening of Parker's bankruptcy case would only serve to
determine the dischargeability of Watson's claim. 25 Next, the bank-
ruptcy court looked at two issues that would affect the dischargeability of
Watson's claim: section 523(a)(3)(A) or under section 523(a)(3)(B) that
the debt was nondischargeable under sections 523(a)(2), (4) or (6). 126
Finding that neither of the section 523 nondischargeability requirements
were met, the bankruptcy court granted Parker a discharge of Watson's
claim.1 27 The bankruptcy appellate panel affirmed the decision of the
court and Watson appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.1
28
On appeal, Watson contended that the bankruptcy panel's decision
to reopen and discharge her claim should have been precluded on two
issues. 12 9 First, Watson argued that various equitable principals should
have precluded Parker from reopening her case. 130 Secondly, Watson
argued that the claim is nondischargeable for two reasons: it arose post-
petition and because the claim otherwise met the nondischargeability
requirements of the Code.'3
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the holding of the
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in Parker 1.132 The Tenth Circuit decided
two issues of first impression. 33 First, the Tenth Circuit adopted the
mechanical approach to determine whether a debtor's claim should be
reopened in a no asset Chapter 7 case with no bar date. 134 Second, the













134. Id. at 1268-69.
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arose pre-petition or post-petition for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code's
automatic stay provision. 135
Under the mechanical approach, a debtor does not need to reopen a
no asset, no bar date case to receive a discharge for an omitted debt be-
cause reopening has no effect on the dischargeability of the omitted
debt.136 By adopting the mechanical approach, the Tenth Circuit joined
the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits. 37 When adopting the mechanical
approach, the Tenth Circuit referred to the bankruptcy appellate panel's
explanation that the mechanical approach is "'better reasoned and more
faithful to the language of the Bankruptcy Code.
'" 138
The bankruptcy appellate panel reasoned that under section 727(b)
of the Code, "the Debtor receives a discharge from all debts that arose
before the date of the order for relief ... unless an exception in 523(a)
applies.' 39 Under section 523(a)(3)(A) "a claim will not be discharged
if it was neither listed nor scheduled and the creditor did not have notice
or actual knowledge of the case so that the creditor could timely file a
claim. 1 40  Since Parker's case was a no asset case with no bar date,
"Watson will have an opportunity to file a claim if any assets are discov-
ered." 4  A no asset case is a bankruptcy case "indicating that no assets
were available for liquidation and distribution to creditors.' 42 Because
Watson would have the opportunity to file a claim if any assets were
discovered, the bankruptcy appellate panel found, and Tenth Circuit af-
firmed that Watson would suffer no prejudice. 143  Therefore, because
"equitable considerations do not impact the dischargeability of a debt
under § 523(a)(3)(A)" it is unnecessary to reopen a debtor's Chapter 7
case for determination of equitable principals such as the debtor's intent
for failing to list the omitted creditor.144
Next, the Tenth Circuit adopted the conduct theory for determining
when a claim arises for purposes of the automatic stay provision. 45 The
135. Id. at 1269.
136. In re Parker 1, 264 B.R. at 694 ("[Tlhe majority of courts apply the mechanical approach
... that pursuant to the plain language of the Bankruptcy Code the debt is discharged by operation of
law and that to reopen a bankruptcy case to schedule a previously unlisted debt in a no asset, no bar
date case has no effect on the dischargeability of the debt."). The logic of this reasoning is apparent:
a no asset case is one where the debtor has no money, liquidated or otherwise, to distribute to the
creditors. Dawson v. Unruh (In re Dawson), 209 B.R. 246, 248 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1997). If a creditor
is omitted from the schedule it has no impact: there are no assets to distribute, and the creditor has no
relief even if he were on the schedule. There are currently no assets, nor were there assets during the
bankruptcy proceeding, so the unscheduled debt is merely discharged as though it were scheduled.
137. In re Parker 11, 313 F.3d at 1269.
138. Id. at 1268 (quoting In re Parker 1, 264 B.R. at 694).
139. In re Parker 1, 264 B.R. at 694.
140. Id. at 694-95.
141. Id. at 695.
142. In re Dawson, 209 B.R. at 248.
143. In re Parker 1, 264 B.R. at 695.
144. Id.
145. In re Parker I. 313 F.3d at 1269-70.
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Tenth Circuit adopted the conduct theory, finding that it was "more in
tune with the plain language and the policy underlying the Bankruptcy
Code."
, 146
First, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the appellate panel's consideration
of the language of the Code. 147 The Court looked to the Code's defini-
tion of "claim," which is defined as a "'right to payment, whether or not
such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contin-
gent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, se-
cured, or unsecured .... The appellate panel reasoned that the piv-
otal word of the Code's definition of "claim" to be "contingent. ' 149 Ref-
erencing Black's Law Dictionary, the court found the definition of "con-
tingent claim" to be "'one which has not accrued and which is dependant
on some future event that may never happen."",150 The Court determined
that the Code "expressly delineates the boundaries of the term claim."'
' 51
Since the Code gives the boundaries of the word "claim" and the defini-
tion includes "contingent claims," a court must encompass this definition
when determining whether a claim existed before the filing of the bank-
ruptcy, pre-petition.1 52 Thus, the appellate panel found that, when deter-
mining if a claim has arisen, the central issue for the court is whether the
claim existed pre-petition, not whether the claim was valid under state
law. 153
Second, the court looked to the policy behind the Code when decid-
ing to adopt the conduct approach. 154 Finding that legislative history
pointed to an expansive definition of the word "claim," 155 the court de-
termined that the philosophy of the Code was to allow the debtor to
achieve a "fresh start. 156 Included in this fresh start philosophy, the
court found that Congress intended that "all legal obligations of the
debtor, no matter how remote or contingent, will be able to be dealt with
in the bankruptcy case." 157 Thus, the Tenth Circuit held that the Bank-
ruptcy Code allows the "broadest possible relief' and the conduct theory
best captures this purpose. 1
58
146. Id. at 1269.
147. Id. at 1268 (quoting In re Parker 1, 264 B.R. at 694-95).
148. In re Parker 1, 264 B.R. at 697 (quoting II U.S.C. § 101 (5)(A)).
149. Id.






156. Id. at 698.
157. Id. at 697 (quoting S. REP. No. 95-989, at 21-22 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787).
158. Id. at 697-98 (quoting S. REP. No. 95-989, at 21-22 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787).
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Finally, the Tenth Circuit used the conduct theory to determine that
Watson's claim did in fact occur pre-petition, and was thus protected by
the Code's automatic stay provision.159 Since conduct giving rise to
Watson's malpractice claim occurred in May 1996, five months before
Parker's Chapter 7 filing, Watson's claim arose prepetition. 60 Watson's
claim arose on the date Parker committed the malpractice.1 61 Therefore,
the Tenth Circuit upheld the bankruptcy appellate panel's decision that
Watson's claim was a prepetition claim and once again found the claim
to be dischargeable.'
62
1I. OTHER CIRCUIT APPROACHES: MECHANICAL APPROACH VERSUS
LOOKING AT THE DEBTOR'S INTENT
A. The Sixth Circuit: In re Madaj, 163 An Example of the Mechanical Ap-
proach
1. Facts
Two over-generous foster parents ("Creditors") lent their son and
his wife money to cover fire damage.164 While the son may have antici-
pated repaying the loan initially, the son and his wife ("Debtors") filed
Chapter 7 bankruptcy instead. 65 Debtors' petition did not list their par-
ents as creditors, 166 Debtors received a discharge, and the no asset case
was closed. 167 Unaware of Debtors' bankruptcy proceedings, Creditors
repeatedly asked Debtors for repayment. 68 Creditors' fruitless requests
led them to file a state action to recover the loan. 169 Thereafter, Debtors
moved to reopen their Chapter 7 case and include the debt to their par-
ents. 70 Debtors claimed that their initial failure to list the creditors was
unintentional and caused by a memory lapse.17' Creditors opposed the
reopening and filed suit.
72
Arguing that Debtors' forgetfulness was insincere and an attempt to
defraud, Creditors argued that a debt can only be discharged if it is
listed. 173 In essence, Creditors argued that Debtor's failure to list the
debt resulted in the nondischarge of their debt.174 Admittedly, within
159. In re Parker 11, 313 F.3d at 1269-70.
160. In re Parkerl, 264 B.R. at 698.
161. Id. at 696, 698.
162. In re Parker H, 313 F.3d at 1270.
163. Zimhelt v. Madaj (In re Madaj), 149 F.3d 467 (6th Cir. 1998).













their argument Creditors agree with Debtors that, had the debt been
originally filed, it would have been discharged.175 Additionally, Creditors
admit that, because this is a no asset case, Creditors would not have re-
ceived payment even if they had filed a claim.176 Thus, Creditors op-




In In re Madaj, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the decisions of both the
bankruptcy court and the district court in denying Debtor's motion to
reopen.178 Additionally, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's hold-
ings that, although debtors cannot reopen their bankruptcy proceeding,
the debt was discharged.179 The Sixth Circuit held that it was unnecessary
for Debtor to reopen a no asset case to receive a discharge from an omit-
ted debt. 80 Thus, the Sixth Circuit held that it is "pointless" to reopen a
no asset case because the scheduling of the debt will have no effect, since
the debt has already been discharged.'
8'
The Sixth Circuit pointed to section 523(a)(3)(A) as the possible
source of the confusion regarding whether it is necessary to reopen a case
for a claim to be discharged. 82 Referring to this confusion surrounding
section 523(a) of the Code, the Sixth Circuit discussed the intricate op-
eration of section 523(a) as it applies to a Chapter 7 proceeding. 83 In its
discussion, the Court found that "even 523(a)(3)(A) does not except an
unscheduled debt from discharge if the creditor had notice or actual
knowledge of the bankruptcy case in time for timely filing of a proof of
claim." 184 The Sixth Circuit further explained that "most of the twists
and turns affecting dischargeability" are accorded to the exceptions for
fraudulent debts in sections 523(a)(2), (4), and (6).185 Reiterating that
section 523(a)(3)(A) does not apply if the creditor had knowledge of the
debtor's bankruptcy proceedings from the scheduling or nontraditional
means, the Sixth Circuit emphasized that the exception under section
523(a)(3)(A) revolves around lack of notice, not actual scheduling.
86
Section 523(a)(3)(A) of the Code excepts from discharge a claim
that the debtor did not list, so that the creditor did not receive notice of






180. See id. at 468-72.
181. Id. at 468.
182. Id.
183. See id. at 469.
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the debtor's failure to list the claim.' 87 The Sixth Circuit held that the
purpose of the section 523(a)(3)(A) exception is to prevent the injustice
that would result if a creditor did not have an opportunity to "participate
in the distribution of the assets of the estate" in a bankruptcy proceed-
ing.' 88 In a no asset case, no injustice will result because there are no
assets to distribute.1 89  The purpose of the exception in section
523(a)(3)(A) is not relevant to a no asset case because injustice cannot
result if there are no assets to distribute. 90 The Sixth Circuit recognized
"that creditors may want to add their names to the matrix in the unlikely
event that the case is eventually reopened in order to distribute previ-
ously undiscovered assets of the estate, but the vast majority of no-asset
cases do not involve such plot twists. ' ' 9 Thus, the Sixth Circuit held
that section 523(a)(3)(A) "operates differently" with a no asset case with
no bar date because there is no injustice for lack of notice to the creditor
for an unscheduled debt.
92
The Sixth Circuit found that "there is no effect" in allowing a debtor
to reopen a case to schedule an omitted debt. 93 No effect is caused by
the reopening because "[a] debtor cannot change the nature of the debt
by failing to list it in his petition and schedules."'194 Once a debtor re-
ceives discharge pursuant to section 727, "debts are either discharged or
they are not discharged .... Section 523(a)(3)(A) cannot save a debt
in a no asset case that would have otherwise been dischargeable because
the debtor did not list it for any reason. 196 Therefore, the Sixth Circuit
held that it is unnecessary to reopen a no asset case for a debt to be dis-
charged. 197
B. The Eleventh Circuit: In re Baitcher, 198 An Example of a Court Look-
ing into Debtor's Intent in Failing to Schedule a Claim
1. Facts
Barbara Baitcher and Daniel Baitcher owned a restaurant, The
Flame, Inc. 199 After a series of unfortunate events, The Flame filed a
187. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3)(A) (2000).
188. In re Madaj, 149 F.3d at 470. "Without the exception in § 523(a)(3)(A), the debtor could
simply deny his uninformed creditors the opportunity to recover from the bankruptcy estate by
omitting their debts from the schedule." Id. at 469.
189. See id. at 470.
190. See id.
191. Id. at 470 n.3.
192. Id. at 470.





198. Samuel v. Baitcher (In re Baitcher), 781 F.2d 1529 (11 th Cir. 1986).
199. In re Baitcher, 781 F.2d at 1530.
632 [Vol. 81:3
IN RE PARKER
petition for bankruptcy. 2°° After the petition in bankruptcy, the Baitchers
were no longer in possession of the restaurant, and a receiver was ap-
pointed. 20 ' After the receiver was appointed, Barbara Baitcher continued
to work at The Flame.2 °2 During this period of time, The Flame's work-
men's compensation insurance lapsed.0 3 Around the same time, Samuel,
a worker, was injured while working at the restaurant. 204 The injuries,
coupled with The Flame's lack of workers' compensation insurance, led
Samuel to file a suit in state court against both Baitchers for liability.
205
In 1979, Barbara Baitcher (Baitcher) petitioned for individual bank-
206ruptcy. 6 The day before Baitcher petitioned for bankruptcy, Samuel's
state action against Baitcher was dismissed.20 7 Samuel was not included
in Baitcher's petition as a creditor.20 8 Baitcher's bankruptcy was dis-
charged in 1980, but Samuel's claim was not discharged because it was
not listed.209 Baitcher's bankruptcy was a no asset case.210
In 1981, Samuel received a judgment against Baitcher from the state
action .21 As a result, Baitcher "moved to reopen her bankruptcy, added
Samuel's name to the list of creditors, and obtained a new discharge ap-
plicable to him., 212 The bankruptcy court allowed Baitcher to reopen the
case.2 13 Consequently, Samuel moved for summary judgment on the
grounds that the complaint was nondischargeable.1 4 The bankruptcy
court found the complaint was dischargeable and summary judgment was
granted in favor of Baitcher.1 5 The district court affirmed and Samuel
appealed the decisions of both courts.216
2. Decision
In In re Baitcher, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Code allows a
debtor to reopen a bankruptcy and schedule an omitted debt when the
debtor failed to schedule the debt originally because of an "honest mis-







206. Id. For the remainder of this section, Baitcher will refer only to Barbara Baitcher. Daniel
Baitcher is not included in this action. See id. at 1530-31.
207. Id. at 1530-3 1.
208. Id. at 1530.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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sign. 21 7 In In re Baitcher, the Eleventh Circuit adopted an equitable ap-
proach for deciding whether to reopen a no asset, no bar date bankruptcy
case.21 8 For Baitcher to receive a discharge under this equitable approach,
the Eleventh Circuit found she must show "absence of fraud or inten-
tional design., 219 The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that inequity would re-
sult if the court did not consider the debtor's intent behind omitting the
debt.220 Because Baitcher could not demonstrate lack of fraud or inten-
tional design in omitting the debt on summary judgment, the Eleventh
Circuit remanded the case back to the lower courts to decide whether to
221reopen the case and discharge the debt.
The Eleventh Circuit discussed some of the facts the lower court
should look into when analyzing Baitcher's intent for omitting the claim
from the bankruptcy.222 In particular, the Eleventh Circuit pointed to
Baitcher's failure to include Samuel's debt in the original petition in light
of including other debts owed by The Flame.2 3 Another troubling fact to
the court was that Baitcher's lawyer filed the bankruptcy claim and also
defended the Samuel claim in court at the time Baitcher omitted the
claim from list.224 Both of these facts could point to Baitcher's use of
fraud or intentional design in omitting Samuel as a creditor. 22' Thus, the
Eleventh Circuit found many possible issues that may prevent a lower
court from reopening Baitcher's bankruptcy and discharging the debt.226
Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit adopted the equitable approach requiring
a court to look into the debtor's intent for failing to list a debt before
reopening the case and discharging the debt.227
217. Id. at 1534 ("[U]nder the new law the old prophylactic rule does not in a no-asset case any
more deny a discharge to one who has failed to schedule for reasons of honest mistake, not fraud or
intentional design." (internal quotations omitted)).
218. See id. at 1533-34.
219. Id. at 1534.
220. See id.
221. Id. at 1535.
222. Id. at 1534.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1530.
225. Id. at 1534.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 1533-34.
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IV. OTHER CIRCUITS' APPROACHES: CONDUCT THEORY VERSUS THE
ACCRUAL THEORY
A. The Fourth Circuit. Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc.,
228 An Example of
the Conduct Approach
1. Facts
A.H. Robins Company (Robins) manufactured a contraceptive de-
vice, the Dalkon Shield, from 1971 to 1974. 229 After receiving numerous
complaints regarding health and safety concerns, Robins discontinued
production of the Dalkon Shield in 1974.230 On August 21, 1985, Robins
filed a petition for Chapter 11 reorganization as a result of the "over-
whelming number of claims filed against it because of the Dalkon Shield
.... ,,23 Mrs. Grady was a user of the Dalkon Shield.232 On the same
day, August 21, Grady was admitted to the hospital with numerous com-
plaints including abdominal pain.233 Days later she was diagnosed with
pelvic inflammatory disease, which ultimately caused her to undergo a
234hysterectomy.
Two months later, on October 15, 1985, Grady filed a civil action
against Robins.235 The action was later transferred to the Eastern District
of Virginia.236 Subsequently, Grady filed a motion in the bankruptcy
court.237 In her motion, Grady requested the court to classify her claim as
post-petition.238 If the bankruptcy court determined that Grady's claim
did not arise until after Robins filed the petition, then Grady's claim
would not be stayed by the automatic stay provision.
239
The bankruptcy court rejected the accrual approach and adopted the
conduct approach in determining that Grady's claim was a pre-petition
claim. 240 The court held that "the right to payment under 11 U.S.C. §
101(4)(A) of Mrs. Grady's claim arose when the acts giving rise to the
liability were performed and thus the claim was pre-petition under 11
U.S.C. § 362(a)(1). ' 241 Because Grady's claim would be pre-petition and
228. 839 F.2d 198 (4th Cir. 1988).










239. Id.; see also I I U.S.C. § 362 (a)(1) (1988).
240. Grady, 839 F.2d at 199.
241. Id.
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The Fourth Circuit adopted the conduct approach in Grady v. A.H.
Robins Co., Inc.243 Grady starts with an analysis of the legislative history
of section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code (Code). 244 The Fourth Circuit
looked to the Congressional history of the Code that relates "[tihe auto-
matic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections .... It gives the
debtor a breathing spell from his creditors., 245 Additionally, the Fourth
Circuit found that Congress intended the "broadest possible relief in the
bankruptcy court.,,246 Finding that the legislative history indicates that a
court should view the automatic stay provision as fundamental to the
Code's broad protection of debtors, the Court found the definition of
"claim" in the automatic stay provision should be defined broadly.247
Grady argued that her suit did not fall within the definition of
"claim" under the automatic stay provision. 248 Grady advocated the defi-
nition of "claim" to be when the right to payment for a claim exists.249
Because state law did not allow her a right to payment until the injury
occurred, Grady argued she did not have a claim until after Robins filed
the petition with the bankruptcy court.250 Thus, Grady's argument was
that the bankruptcy court should look to state law to define when a claim
arises, not federal law. 25 ' The Fourth Circuit rejected Grady's argument,
which would have resulted in the adoption of the accrual approach for
determining when a claim arises for purposes of the automatic stay pro-
252vision.
The Fourth Circuit rejected the accrual approach for several rea-
sons. 25 3 First, bankruptcy courts do not apply state law: they follow theBankruptcy Code.2 54 "[T]he bankruptcy Code is superimposed upon the
242. Id. at 198.
243. Id. at 199.
244. Id. at 200-01.
245. Id. at 200 (quoting S. REP. No. 95-989, at 54-55 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 5840; H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 340-41 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6296-
97).
246. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 95-989, at 21-22 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5807-08; H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 309 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6266).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. See id. at 201.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 200-01.
252. See id. at 201.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 201-02.
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law of the State which has created the obligation. 255 Accordingly, the
Fourth Circuit found that the automatic stay provision of the Code is the
pertinent law for determining when a claim arises, not the law of the
state.256 Once again, the Court stressed the importance of the automatic
stay provision, stating: "Absent a stay of litigation against the debtor,
dismemberment rather than reorganization would, in many or even most
cases, be the inevitable result. 257 Thus, the Fourth Circuit determined
the Code would be the prevailing law because of the high importance of
protecting the debtor from creditors, which is demonstrated by the auto-
matic stay provision.258
Next, the Fourth Circuit looked to the words of the automatic stay
provision.25 9 "Section 362(a)(1) provides for an automatic stay of, among
other things, judicial action against the debtor ' . . . to recover a claim
against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under
this title."'' 260 The Fourth Circuit also looked to Section 101(4)(A) which
"defines a claim to be a 'right to payment whether or not such right is
reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, ma-
tured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unse-
cured.', 2 61 The court then went through the same definition analysis as
the Tenth Circuit in In re Parker II, discussed above in section II A. 2. of
this survey.262 The Fourth Circuit found that Grady's claim was contin-
gent because it was a claim conditioned upon an uncertain future
263event. Thus, a contingent claim includes a claim in which no right to
264immediate payment exists.
The Fourth Circuit determined that Congress intended to include a
contingent claim as a right to payment within the protection of section
362(a)(1)'s automatic stay.265 A broad definition of "claim" was consis-
tent with the legislative history intending that bankruptcy allow a debtor
broad relief from creditors.266 Finally, the Fourth Circuit considered that
the bankruptcy court probably would have been able to classify Grady's
claim as pre-petition by use of its equitable powers under 11 U.S.C. §
255. Id. at 202 (referring to Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156,
162 (1946) ("In determining what claims are allowable and how a debtor's assets shall be distrib-
uted, a bankruptcy court does not apply the law of the state where it sits.")).
256. See id. at 201-02.
257. Id. at 202.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1988)).
261. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A) (1988) (currently codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A)
(2000)).
262. Id.; see supra notes 147-53 and accompanying text.
263. Grady, 839 F.2d at 202-03.
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105(a).267 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit found that the conduct approach
268was the proper approach to determine when a claim arose.
B. Third Circuit: In re M. Frenville Co.,2 69 An Example of the Accrual
Approach
1. Facts
A&B was an accounting firm employed by M. Frenville Co.
270
A&B prepared certified financial statements for Frenville during 1978
and 1979.271 In 1980, Frenville filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.2 72 Subse-
quently, bank investors of Frenville filed an action against A&B in 1981
alleging, among other things, that A& B negligently and recklessly pre-
pared Frenville's financial statements. 73 In 1983, as a result of the suit
by the banks, A&B sought to include Frenville as a third-party defen-
dant.274 A&B filed a petition in the bankruptcy court, seeking a declara-
tion that the automatic stay provision of section 362(a)(1) did not bar the
claim. 275 Both the bankruptcy court and the district court held that the
automatic stay provision barred A&B's claim against Frenville.276 A&B
appealed to the Third Circuit.277
2. Decision
The Third Circuit held that A&B's claim was not barred by the
automatic stay provision of section 362(a)(1). 278 The Third Circuit
adopted the accrual approach to determine the date a claim arises for
purposes of the automatic stay provision. 279 The Court held that "[o]nly
proceedings that could have been commenced or claims that arose before
the filing of the bankruptcy petitions are automatically stayed.,,280 Ac-
cording to the Third Circuit, focusing on the harm, not the conduct, was
the Congressional intent behind the automatic stay provision.281 Thus, the
Third Circuit, searching for the date the harm occurred, looked to
267. Id. (referring to 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988)).
268. Id.
269. Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332 (3rd Cir.
1984).




274. Id. at 333-34.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 334.
277. Id. at 333.
278. Id. at 337.
279. Id.




whether A&B could bring a claim prior to when the bankruptcy petitions
were filed.282
To determine whether A&B could bring a claim prior to Frenville's
filing for bankruptcy, the Third Circuit looked to the Code's definition of
"claim. '283 Unlike the Fourth and Tenth Circuits, the Third Circuit de-
termined that the Code's definition of "claim" as a "right to payment"
was the "threshold requirement" for determining when a claim may be
brought for purposes of the automatic stay provision.284 Because the
Code does not define when a right to payment arises, the Third Circuit
determined that, absent "overriding federal law," the court must look to
state law.285
The Third Circuit looked to New York law to determine when A&B
was able to bring a claim for contribution or indemnity against Fren-
ville.286 New York law allows a claim for contribution or indemnity to be
commenced "at the time the defendant... serves his answer in the suit
brought by the plaintiff .. 287 Under New York law, A&B could not
commence its action for indemnity against Frenville until the suit was
instituted by the banks against A&B.288 The banks instituted their suit
against A&B fourteen months after Frenville began bankruptcy proceed-
ings.289 Therefore, the Third Circuit determined the claim arose post-
290petition and was not barred by the automatic stay provision.
V. ANALYSIS
In In re Parker II, the Tenth Circuit decided on two approaches for
interpreting the Bankruptcy Code: the mechanical approach for reopen-
ing a case under section 523(a)(3)(A) in a no asset, no bar date Chapter 7
bankruptcy, and the conduct approach for purposes of the automatic stay
provision.291 By adopting both the mechanical and conduct approaches,
the Tenth Circuit is protecting the debtor and promoting the "fresh start"
philosophy of the Bankruptcy Code.292 The mechanical approach towards
reopening a bankruptcy case under section 523(a)(3)(A) protects the
debtor by not requiring the no asset, no bar date bankruptcy to be re-
282. Id.
283. Id. at 336.
284. Id. ("At first glance, A & B might be thought to have had an unliquidated, contingent,
unmatured and disputed claim pre-petition. While all of these adjectives may describe A & B's cause
of action against the Frenvilles, the threshold requirement of a claim must first be met -- there must
be a 'right to payment."' (quoting I 1 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A) (1982)).
285. Id. at 337.
286. Id. at 335.
287. Id.
288. See id. at 337.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 337-38.
291. Watson v. Parker (In re Parker II), 313 F.3d 1267, 1268-69 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied,
124 U.S. 429 (2003).
292. See In re Parker 11, 313 F.3d at 1268-69.
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opened for a debtor to receive a discharge from an omitted claim. 293 Con-
sequently, a debtor will not be required to explain why she omitted the
debt from the original bankruptcy schedule.294 Additionally, the me-
chanical approach protects the debtor by holding that a section
523(a)(3)(A) nondischarge exception for lack of timely notice does not
apply in a no asset, no bar date bankruptcy.295 The conduct approach to
the Code's automatic stay provision also protects the debtor, by allowing
an expansive definition of a "pre-petition" claim that reaches to all con-
duct prior to the bankruptcy proceeding, regardless of whether the credi-
tor could have filed the claim prior to the bankruptcy. 296 Thus, in In re
Parker II, the Tenth Circuit's holding regarding approaches to interpret-
ing the Code show the Tenth Circuit's desire to protect the debtor and
promote the Code's fresh start philosophy.297
The mechanical approach allows a debtor in a Chapter 7 no asset,
no bar date bankruptcy to receive a discharge for an omitted debt without
reopening the claim. 298 Because section 523(a)(3)(A) does not apply in a
no asset, no bar date Chapter 7 case, courts using the mechanical ap-
proach hold that reopening the case is not required for a discharge under
section 727 of the Code.299 By not requiring a debtor to reopen the case,
the court does not require the debtor to explain why the debt was origi-
nally omitted from the bankruptcy schedule.30 0 The court will not inquire
into the debtor's intent for failing to schedule the claim. 30 1 When a court
does not inquire into the debtor's intent, it allows a debtor to easily re-
ceive a discharge for an omitted debt that would otherwise not be dis-
chargeable.3 °2 By failing to list a debt in the original schedule, a debtor
does not change the "nature of the debt.' 30 3 Consequently, an omitted
debt will be nondischargeable only if it meets one of the section 523 ex-
ceptions, excluding section 523(a)(3)(A) which holds a debt nondis-
chargeable for lack of notice.304 The mechanical approach thus allows a
favorable result to a debtor that has omitted a creditor.
305
Recall in In re Madaj, the debtors failed to list a debt owed to their
own foster parents.3 6 The debtors claimed this failure to be simply an act
293. See Edgar, supra note 13, at 9-12.
294. See Watson v. Parker (In re Parker I), 264 B.R. 685, 694 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2001), affid,
313 F.3d 1267 (10th Cir. 2002).
295. See 4 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GUIDE 76.06 (2003).
296. See Azaria, supra note 81, at 213-14.
297. See In re Parker l, 313 F.3d at 1268-69.
298. Id. at 1269 (quoting In re Parker I, 264 B.R. at 695).
299. In re Parker 1, 264 B.R. at 694.
300. See id.
301. In re Parker 11, 313 F.3d at 1269.
302. See id. at 1268-69 (quoting In re Parker 1, 264 B.R. at 694).
303. Zirnhelt v. Madaj (In re Madaj), 149 F.3d 467, 472 (6th Cir. 1998).
304. In re Madaj, 149 F.3d at 472.
305. See id.; In re Parker HI, 313 F.3d at 1268-69 (citing In re Parker 1, 264 B.R. at 694-95).
306. In re Madaj, 149 F.3d at 468.
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of a forgetful memory. °7 The parents, the creditors, argued that this
memory failure was not credible because of their persistent reminder to
the debtors of the loan. 308 The Sixth Circuit adopted the mechanical ap-
proach in In re Madaj.309 Applied to the facts of In re Madaj, the me-
chanical approach prevented the court from further inquiring into the
credibility of the debtor's forgetfulness because the debt would have
been discharged if originally listed.310 An inquiry into the debtor's intent
for failing to schedule the creditors may have unveiled just how incredi-
ble a foster son's memory failure of a debt owed to his own parents
would be.31 ' A court, having inquired into these circumstances of the
debtors' forgetfulness, may have found fraud or intentional design and
refused to reopen the bankruptcy and discharge the debt.31 2 Thus, Madaj
illustrates the favorable effect the mechanical approach has toward debt-
ors.
In re Parker II also illustrates the protection the mechanical ap-
313proach offers debtors. In In re Parker II, the debtor attorney was sued
for malpractice by his creditor client.314 During a deposition the debtor
told the creditor he "made the conscious decision" to omit the claim from
his bankruptcy to allow the creditor recourse against him.315 Perhaps
because of a change of heart, the debtor later moved to reopen his chap-
ter 7 no asset, no bar date case to add the omitted debt and receive a dis-
charge.31 6 By adopting the mechanical approach, the Tenth Circuit did
not inquire into whether it was equitable for the debtor to have a change
of heart and schedule the omitted debt.317 Thus, regardless of why the
debtor failed to list the debt originally, the case was reopened and the
debt will be discharged unless an exception other than section
523(a)(3)(A) applies.31 8 Therefore, In re Parker II also illustrates the
protection the mechanical approach offers the debtor.319 In In re Parker
II, the mechanical approach literally protected the debtor from his own
admission that he intentionally "forgot" to list the debt.320
The Tenth Circuit's adoption of the conduct approach to determine
if a claim is pre-petition or post-petition, for purposes of the automatic
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 472.
310. Id.
311. See id. at 468.
312. E.g., Samuel v. Baitcher (In re Baitcher), 781 F.2d 1529, 1534 (11 th Cir. 1986) (finding
"intentional design, if not fraud" upon inquiry into the debtor's forgetfulness in omitting a creditor
from the schedule).
313. See In re Parker 1l, 313 F.3d at 1268-69 (citing In re Parker 1, 264 B.R. at 694-95).
314. In re Parker 1, 264 B.R. at 690-91.
315. Id. at 691.
316. Id.
317. See In re Parker 11, 313 F.3d at 1269.
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stay provision of the Code, also serves to protect debtors.321 When a
claim is classified as pre-petition, a debtor is afforded relief from credi-
tors under the Code's automatic stay provision.322 A debtor receives pro-
tection from claims classified as pre-petition under the Code and does
not receive protection from post-petition claims.323 By adopting the con-
duct approach rather than the accrual approach to determine whether a
claim is pre-petition or post-petition, the Tenth Circuit allows more
claims to be classified as pre-petition than the accrual approach allows.32n
The conduct approach uses federal, rather than state, law. The use of
federal law keeps claims from being classified as post-petition just be-
cause state law would prevent claims from being brought until after the
bankruptcy proceeding.325 Thus, the conduct approach protects debtors
by not creating a loophole for pre-petition conduct to be classified as a
post-petition claim under state law.326
In re M. Frenville Co., decided by the Third Circuit, the only circuit
that uses the accrual method, illustrates the greater protection the conduct
approach grants debtors in comparison to the accrual approach. Recall in
In re M. Frenville Co., the creditor A&B worked for the debtor Frenville
as an independent auditor.327 Frenville later petitioned for Chapter 7
bankruptcy.328 When A&B was sued for allegedly preparing false finan-
cial statements for Frenville, A&B sought indemnification from Fren-
ville.329 The conduct giving rise to the claim was the creation of false
financial statements, and occurred prior to Frenville filing for bank-
ruptcy.33 If the Court had followed the conduct approach, A&B's claim
would have been considered a pre-petition claim and the debtor Frenville
would have received relief from the Code's automatic stay provision.
Instead, using the accrual approach, the court looked to state law to de-
termine whether the creditor could have brought the indemnification
cause of action prior to the bankruptcy.331 Under the accrual approach,
because A&B could not have brought their claim against Frenville until
after the date of the bankruptcy proceedings, A&B's claim was classified
as post-petition and not subject to the automatic stay provision.332 Thus,
in Frenville, the debtor would have received greater protection had the
321. See In re Parker II, 313 F.3d at 1269-70.
322. Azaria, supra note 81, at 209.
323. Id. at 207-08.
324. See John W. Ames et al., Toxins-Are-Us, Future Claimants in Mass Tort Bankruptcy
Cases, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 8, 8 n.1 (1994).
325. See id. See generally Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.), 744
F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984) (applying New York law to resolve a bankruptcy issue).
326. See Ames et al., supra note 324, at 8 n. 1.
327. In re M. Frenville Co., 744 F.2d at 333.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 333-34.
330. Id. at 334.




court used the conduct approach for purposes of the automatic stay pro-
vision of the Code.
In re Parker II also illustrates the protection the conduct approach
affords the debtor under the automatic stay provision.333 Watson, the
creditor, argued that Kansas law prevented her from bringing a cause of
action until after Parker, the debtor, filed bankruptcy.334 The Tenth Cir-
cuit, by adopting the conduct approach in In re Parker II, did not look to
state law to determine whether the creditor's claim was pre-petition or
post-petition.335 Thus, the Tenth Circuit protected the debtor by adopting
the conduct approach because the accrual approach to the automatic stay
provision may have classified the claim as post-petition, precluding dis-
charge of the debt in the bankruptcy proceeding.
CONCLUSION
In In re Parker II, the Tenth Circuit chose two paths of interpreting
the Bankruptcy Code. Both of the Tenth Circuit's chosen paths of inter-
pretation show the Tenth's Circuit's desire to protect the debtor and
promote the Code's "fresh start" philosophy. The Tenth Circuit's adop-
tion of the mechanical approach protects the debtor in a Chapter 7 no
asset, no bar date bankruptcy by not requiring the debtor to reopen the
case to receive a discharge. The mechanical approach further protects the
debtor by finding that section 523(a)(3)(A) cannot change an otherwise
dischargeable debt into a nondischargeable debt because of the debtor's
failure to originally list it. Finally, the conduct approach the Tenth Cir-
cuit adopted in In re Parker H protects the debtor by not creating a loop-
hole for pre-petition conduct to be classified a post-petition claim under
state law. It does not allow state law to reach into the Code and create the
possibility of varying levels of debtor protection depending upon the
state law that applies. In In re Parker II, the Tenth Circuit not only chose
the most traveled paths of Bankruptcy Code interpretation, but also the
paths protecting the debtor and the philosophy of the Code.
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